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The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo  
 
The article considers the state of UN peacekeeping through the prism of its long-running 
operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Focusing in particular on the challenges 
raised by use of force and the protection of civilians in conditions of on-going armed conflict, 
it argues that UN field operations must be aligned much more closely than they have been 
over the past fifteen years to political and diplomatic efforts aimed at securing viable 
political settlements to internal conflict. The issues raised by the history of the UN’s troubled 
mission in Congo are deeply relevant to the wider discussion of the organisation’s role in the 
field of peace and security.   
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In October 2014, with the end of his second term as secretary-general of the United 
Nations well within sight and the 70th anniversary of the organisation fast approaching, Ban 
Ki-Moon announced the establishment a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations. The panel, chaired by Jose Ramos-Horta, former President of Timor-Leste, was 
asked to provide “a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations today, 
and the emerging needs of the future.”1 The last such review had been led by Lahkdar 
Brahimi, some fifteen years earlier.2 It was time for an update: “The world is changing and 
UN peace operations must change with it if they are to remain an indispensable and 
effective tool in promoting international peace and security.”3  
The present article examines the state and challenges of UN peacekeeping through 
the prism of its long-running operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).4 It is 
premised on the view that the troubled history of the UN’s involvement there since 1999, 
while it is a story that is of interest in its own right, also raises wider issues about the UN’s 
role in international peace and security, issues that go well beyond the discussion of how 
best to reform and improve the UN’s machinery for peacekeeping. The article is especially 
concerned with two sets of issues arising out of the UN’s Congo mission, both of which go 
the heart of the larger strategic question of whether and how UN peacekeeping can be 
made to serve as an “effective tool” in the field of peace and security.  
The first of these concerns the use of force in UN peacekeeping and, more 
specifically, its utility in terms of advancing the protection of civilians (POC) in armed 
conflict. When peacekeeping first emerged as a distinctive activity of the UN in the 1950s, 
one of its chief and defining characteristics was the “prohibition against any initiative in the 
use of force.”5 Along with the principles of consent and impartiality, this attachment to the 
minimum use of force except in self-defence came to constitute the core principles of so-
called classical peacekeeping. Ever since the horrors of Angola, Somalia, former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda in the first half of the 1990s, however, a combination of normative, operational 
and political pressures has prompted a shift – evident in policy debates, operations and 
                                                     
1 “Statement by the Secretary-General”, 31 October 2014. 
2 S/2000/809, 21 August 2000 (“Brahimi report”). 
3  “Statement by the Secretary-General”, 31 October 2014. 
4 Throughout this article the term Congo refers to the DRC.  
5 “Summary Study”, A/3943, 9 October 1958.  
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numerous Security Council resolutions – in favour of greater “robustness” and a widening of 
the remit for the use of force by “blue helmets”. This trend has been especially notable in 
the DRC, where it culminated in the decision by Security Council in March 2013 to 
strengthen MONUSCO with the creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) whose 
mandate would be “to carry out targeted offensive operations … in a robust, highly mobile 
and versatile manner.”6 Inextricably linked to the increased emphasis on “robustness” and 
the greater willingness to experiment with the use of force, has been the growing  
importance of civilian protection as a mandated task for UN peacekeepers. Notwithstanding 
these developments, the record of UN’s achievement in the DRC remains, on balance, 
profoundly discouraging. By late 2015, an estimated seventy armed groups were operating 
in Eastern Congo and the number of internally displaced (IDPs) in the whole of the country 
was over 1.5 million.7 
The deeper reason for this dismal picture is closely connected to the second set of 
issues alluded to above: the challenges and inherent limitations arising out of the UN’s role 
as a third-party actor in complex civil wars. As will be argued more fully, the central question 
arising out of the UN’s peacekeeping operation in the DRC is whether the UN, as an 
intergovernmental, intensely political and bureaucratically fragmented organisation, is, or 
ever will be, structurally equipped and politically suited to take on a coercive role in internal 
conflicts and civil war-like situations. If, as the UN’s experience in the DRC overwhelmingly 
suggests, the obstacles to assuming such a role remain formidable, it raises the additional 
question of whether the drift toward robust peacekeeping has itself detracted from, or even 
undermined, the pursuit of more promising ways in which the UN and its peacekeeping 
instrument can help to mitigate and resolve seemingly intractable conflicts. In short, has the 
shift towards greater robustness forced peacekeeping into a dead end? If so, in what 
directions should the focus and priorities of peacekeeping be reoriented? The very fact that 
four of the UN’s largest missions after the DRC – in Darfur, the Central African Republic 
(CAR), Mali, and South Sudan – continue to operate with robust mandates and POC 
responsibilities in conditions where there is precious little peace to keep, makes exploring 
these questions all the more important. 
 
Structure and Argument in Brief 
                                                     
6 S/RES/2098, 28 March 2013.  
7 Jason Stearns and Christoph Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo”, Congo 
Research Group, CIC, December 2015; and www.internal-
displacement.org/database/country?iso3=COD 
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The article proceeds in three parts.Part one examines developments in UN peacekeeping 
since its resurgence in the late 1990s. It traces important changes in the geopolitical and 
normative balance of influences bearing on UN peacekeeping, but also highlights equally, if 
not more, important elements of continuity in the history of UN field operations, evident 
both in the UN’s modus operandi and in the nature of the challenges presented by third-
party intervention in civil-war like situations. The elements of change and continuity thus 
outlined provide an essential context within which a more detailed analysis of the UN’s 
Congo mission can be placed. 
Part two turns in greater detail to the organisation’s mission in the DRC, focusing 
above all on the issues raised by the use of force and the protection of civilians. It is 
particularly concerned in this respect with the record of the FIB whose creation Ban Ki-Moon 
at one point hailed as a “milestone” in the evolution of UN peacekeeping.8 It argues centrally 
that the history of the UN’s travails in Congo is of wider interest because it captures, 
perhaps more starkly than any other mission, many of the underlying and unresolved 
tensions currently at the heart of UN peacekeeping. In particular, it highlights the growing 
disconnect between, on the one hand, increasingly ambitious mandates reflecting a shift in 
the normative aspirations surrounding peacekeeping, and, on the other, a persistent failure 
by the Council to provide strategic direction, and by the membership at large to provide 
adequate resources, for operations. Without these conditions in place, it has proved, and 
will continue to prove, impossible to translate normative aspirations into realisable 
objectives for peacekeepers on the ground. 
Finally, building on but looking beyond the UN’s chequered history in Congo, the 
article turns to the wider lessons regarding the use of force and considers their implications 
for the role that peacekeeping, alongside other instruments at the UN’s disposal, can play in 
promoting international peace and security. It argues, centrally, that UN field operations – in 
conception, design and operational focus – must be tailored and aligned much more 
carefully than they have been over the past decade and a half to political and diplomatic 
efforts aimed at securing and consolidating viable settlements to internal conflict. 
Encouragingly, this is also one of the clearest and most important messages to emerge from 
the report of Ramos-Hortas’ High Level Panel, presented to the secretary-general in June 
2015.9  
                                                     
8 “Secretary-General's Remarks at Security Council Debate”, 11 June 2014.  
9 “Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People”, 16 June 2015. 
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The article concludes by calling for a revitalisation of UN’s role as a political actor 
actively engaged in searching for, mediating and mobilising support for political settlements. 
 
 
Elements of Change and Continuity in UN Peacekeeping, 1999-2016 
 
 
It is easy to dismiss Ban Ki-Moon’s assertion that “the world is changing and UN 
peace operations must change with it” as little more than a throwaway line designed to 
justify his decision, taken without prior consultation, to set up a large-scale review of UN 
peace operations. It is nonetheless a claim that merits further scrutiny. To assess it critically, 
however, a conceptual distinction needs to be drawn, and the relationship explored, 
between two levels of change and continuity.   
The first of these covers a set of broader contextual factors that have always, 
whether directly or indirectly, had a critical bearing on the practice of UN peacekeeping. 
These include, in the first instance, the state of political relations among the members of the 
Security Council, especially its five permanent members (P5), and the impact of those 
relations at any one point on the dynamics of Council decision-making; second, the evolving 
normative climate of international relations and its impact on the expectations surrounding 
UN peacekeeping; and, third, the machinery and workings of the organisation that support 
peacekeepers in the field.  
The second area covers, more straightforwardly, specific developments in the 
practice of UN peacekeeping that have taken place over the past decade and a half. 
Influenced in complex and paradoxical ways by Council politics, normative pressures and 
organisational constraints, these, too, may usefully be grouped under three headings: those 
relating to the demand for and supply of peacekeeping troops; those relating to the tasks 
and mandates formally entrusted to peacekeepers; and, finally, developments relating to 
the basic principles and rules that have historically governed the conduct of operations, 
including the use of force.   
 
The Evolving Context of UN Peacekeeping: Geopolitics, Norms and Organisation  
 
UN peacekeeping operations are authorised by the Security Council, which draws 
up, through a process of political consultation, accommodation and bargaining, the mandate 
for individual missions. Ideally, that process should translate into a mandate that is credible, 
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internally consistent, adequately resourced and achievable. Even at the best of times, 
however, peacekeeping mandates – the outcome of what is usually an intensely political 
process – have tended to fall short of the ideal. It is hardly surprising therefore that the 
steady deterioration of relations among the P5 – a feature of the entire period under review 
but one that has intensified markedly since 2011 – should have affected Council politics and 
mandate formulation in adverse fashion.  
Especially significant has been the worsening of relations between Western Council 
members and Russia under the regime of Vladimir Putin since Ban-Kin Moon became 
Secretary-General in January 2007.10 Following the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 
and its messy aftermath, relations have deteriorated still further, fuelled by profound 
disagreements over policy towards the civil war in Syria and the wider Middle East, and, 
above all, by the fall-out from Russia’s transparently illegal annexation of Crimea in March 
2014.11 The extent to which relations have changed from a period of comparative harmony 
among Council members in the early post-Cold War era to the present, was evident in the 
open debate on the UN’s role in international peace and security held in February 2015, 
during which Sergey Lavrov, dispensing with diplomatic niceties, lambasted the US for 
pursuing “the illusory goal of world domination” and for turning the Council itself into “a 
platform for propagandised confrontation”.12 There has been a tendency among some UN-
watchers to view this kind of language and, more generally, Russian positioning and 
manoeuvring within UN forums, as no more than an attempt by Moscow to assert Russia’s 
status as a Great Power. While this is undoubtedly a key motivation behind Putin’s foreign 
policy behaviour, focusing on it alone is to ignore deep and genuine differences over 
interests and values among leading Council members. On a wide range of substantive issues, 
there is no escaping the fact that “Moscow and the West have competing, conflicting and 
entirely incompatible agendas”.13 The resulting tensions are increasingly impacting directly 
and negatively on UN operations, as well as on the organisation’s scope for constructive 
political action in relation to on-going conflicts, in places such as South Sudan and Burundi.14  
Although a different dynamic is at work, relations between Western powers and 
China on the Council have also taken a turn for the worse, in particular, following NATO’s 
                                                     
10 Over this period Russia has cast its veto 10 times. By contrast, over the previous 20 years, it used 
the veto on only three occasions.  
11 Security Council, 7138th Meeting, 15 March 2014, S/PV.7138. 
12 “Sergey Lavrov, Address at Security Council”, New York, 23 February 2015.  
13 Keir Giles, et al, The Russian Challenge, Chatham House Report, June 2015, p.1.  
14 Richard Gowan, “Burundi Crisis Latest Victim of Russia-West Standoff at UN”, World Politics Review, 
9 November 2015. For an astute analysis of “Russia’s preferred tactics” at the UN, see Richard Gowan, 
“Bursting the UN Bubble: How to Counter Russia in the Security Council”, ECFR, June 2015, p.3.    
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military intervention in Libya.15 At the same time, substantive differences over the question 
of intervention for humanitarian purposes have crystallised more sharply between Western 
and “emerging” powers, notably India, Brazil, and South Africa, all of whom are important 
troop contributors to UN operations.  
In what ways have these developments, and the power political realignments they 
signify, influenced the Council’s engagement with peacekeeping? First and, on the face of it, 
most strikingly, the loss of collegiality among the P5 has not prevented the Council from 
authorising new missions. Indeed, since 1999, 21 new operations have been established and 
the total number of personnel deployed – some 125,000 in late 2015 – remains close to an 
all time high.16 The explanation for this paradox lies in a combination of two factors.  
On the one hand, it is clear that the Council’s readiness to establish new missions 
points to the persistence of a long-standing tendency of which the Brahimi Panel was 
especially critical, namely, using peacekeeping operations to demonstrate resolve and give 
the appearance of action without providing the resources and political commitment 
necessary for the mission to stand much chance of success. To this one may add the habit – 
especially pronounced when Council members are divided over policy yet do not consider 
their vital interests to be at stake – of dumping particularly intractable problems on the UN. 
Although these tendencies have been more transparently in evidence in some cases than in 
others, the fact remains that few, if any, of the mandates given to missions since 2000 have 
met Brahimi’s ideal requirements of clarity, credibility and achievability.17 While achieving 
perfect clarity will always prove illusory, the tendency for operations to be driven by factors 
extraneous to the conflict itself has plainly been aggravated by the deep divisions that now 
exist within the Council. The most serious operational consequence of this lies in its impact 
on the Council’s ability – not impressive at the best of times – to provide strategic direction 
and effective political support for peacekeepers on the ground.  
This still does not wholly explain the high number of new operations launched, and 
it is here that the second contextual factor alluded to comes into play: the Council’s 
willingness to authorise new missions also reflects important changes in the normative 
climate and expectations bearing on peacekeeping. That this should be so is hardly 
surprising. The driving motivation behind the creation of the Brahimi Panel was the desire to 
ensure that the horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica would never be repeated on the UN’s 
                                                     
15 Although the veto has been cast jointly by China and Russia on 6 occasions since 2007, it would be 
wrong to view them as locked in a permanent commonality of interest and outlook, something that is 
clear, inter alia, from China’s ambiguous response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
16 See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml    
17 “Brahimi report”, paras 56-64. 
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watch, and the actions and inactions of UN peacekeepers in those two instances have 
provided an essential frame of reference for subsequent discussions about the 
responsibilities and expectations of blue helmets. They also provided the defining historical 
backdrop to the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – the idea that individual 
states and, should they fail, the “international community, through the UN”, have a 
“responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.”18  
It is true that the extent to which “purely” humanitarian considerations actually 
displace interest-based and power-political calculations when states authorise missions 
under UN auspices can easily be exaggerated. Certainly, a decade on from the General 
Assembly’s endorsement of the R2P in principle, there is, plainly, no agreement among 
states about the criteria for intervening forcibly on humanitarian grounds, nor is there any 
evidence to suggest that solidarist values have been widely internalised among member 
states. As for the “operationalization” of R2P, as distinct from the general principles 
underlying it, it remains deeply contested.  
For all this, and notwithstanding the deterioration of relations among the P5, the 
shift in normative climate has clearly influenced peacekeeping, even though it remains only 
one of the factors that have prompted the Council to establish new missions. Thus, less than 
a month after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Council voted unanimously in favour of 
establishing a new, ambitious and large-scale operation in the Central African Republic.19 
Despite massive logistical challenges, operational overstretch, and tensions among Council 
members, MINUSCA was entrusted with a Chapter VII mandate that placed the protection of 
civilians at risk from mass atrocity crimes at the centre of its mission. This is not the only 
mission to have been set up in such circumstances. As such, it points to a more general and 
paradoxical effect of developments since 2000: contrary to the recommendations of the 
Brahimi Report, the Council has increasingly come to authorise peacekeeping operations 
where there is no peace to keep, and, critically, has done so without a lessening of ambitions 
or a reduction in the range of operational tasks given to peacekeepers. A deeply problematic 
consequence of these developments has been for UN missions to find themselves assigned 
with a range of competing, often conflicting, objectives.  
                                                     
18 “2005 World Summit Outcome”, A/RES/60/1, para. 139. 
19 S/RES/2149, 10 April 2014. A few days later, in a resolution marking the twentieth anniversary of 
the Rwanda genocide, the Council unanimously reaffirmed the relevant paragraphs of the 2005 
Outcome Document on the R2P. S/RES/2150 (2014), 16 April 2014. 
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If Council politics and the normative expectations surrounding UN peacekeeping 
represent areas of change since 1999, though they are complex and contradictory in their 
effects, among those things that have not changed are certain fundamental characteristics 
of the UN as an organisation. Indeed, Conor Cruise O’Brien, though he was writing in the late 
1960s, perceptively captured basic truths that remain valid to this day. “The very word 
‘organisation’”, he observed, “is deceptive in that it suggests a disciplined and co-ordinated 
effort to reach some concrete end … while the UN moves, under the stress of conflicting 
impulses, and in rather chaotic ways, towards ends, which are defined in only the most 
general terms, and about the precise definition of which the highest management is 
permanently divided.”20 While there are areas of policy that provide partial exceptions to 
this picture, the UN remains an intensely political institution whose agencies and 
programmes have always enjoyed a high degree of functional autonomy, notwithstanding 
bouts of reformatory zeal displayed by secretary-generals throughout its history. These 
realities, an inescapable consequence of power politics and intergovernmentalism at the 
heart of the organisation, are too often factored out of discussions about UN reform. And 
yet, they are crucial to any assessment of the actual functioning and performance of the UN, 
also in the field of peacekeeping. The Sisyphean quality of the many efforts undertaken to 
strengthen support for UN missions in the field – including attempts to rationalise arcane 
and dysfunctional regulations governing procurement and financing; creating a dependable 
logistics support system; introducing a less headquarters-focused human resources policy; 
rationalising mission analysis and planning processes – can only be fully understood in light 
of these, essentially political, constraints. Depressingly, in its diagnosis of the “structural 
dysfunctions” bedevilling the system meant to serve peacekeepers on the ground, Ramos-
Horta’s High Level Panel found that things have, if anything, gotten worse over the past 
fifteen years: “The messages the Panel has received from the field have been resounding: 
UN administrative procedures are failing missions and their mandates.”21  
 
Developments in UN Peacekeeping Practise 
     
The geopolitical changes, normative pressures and organisational constraints 
sketched above provide the backdrop for and help explain more specific developments in 
                                                     
20 Conor Cruise O’Brien, Sacred Drama (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), p. 18. 
21 “Uniting Our Strengths for Peace”, para. 289. For the persistence of the challenges facing the UN in 
the above-mentioned areas, see Marrack Goulding, Practical Measures to Enhance the UN’s 
Effectiveness in the Field of Peace and Security, Report Submitted to the Secretary-General of the UN, 
New York, 30 June 1997.  
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UN peacekeeping over the past decade and a half: developments relating to the demand 
and supply of personnel; to the mandate and operational focus of missions; and to the more 
robust use of force by peacekeepers.  
With the current number of uniformed personnel on peacekeeping duty hovering 
around 105,000, up from less than 20,000 in 1999 and comfortably above the previous peak 
of nearly 80, 000 in September 1994, both the demand for UN peacekeepers and the tempo 
of operations have never been greater. The inevitable strains placed by sheer numbers on 
the UN’s peacekeeping machinery have only been aggravated by the tendency to deploy in 
conditions where there is little or no peace to keep. Operating effectively in such 
environments has been further hampered by the absence of surge capacity and a long-
standing, seemingly chronic, shortage of specialist capacities and enablers in key areas such 
as engineering, intelligence, aviation (especially dedicated helicopter support) and logistics. 
These weaknesses, which crucially affect the tactical mobility and operational flexibility of 
forces, have become more acute as a result of important changes in the supply and 
composition of UN troops since the 1990s. While the top financial contributors to UN 
peacekeeping continue to hail from the West and Japan – with the US paying nearly 30 per 
cent in a league of its own – troop requirements for UN activities are now overwhelmingly 
met by the developing world, with the “big three” South Asian countries of Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and India providing around 30% of the total, followed by Ethiopia, Nepal, Rwanda, 
Senegal and Ghana, all making significant contributions of both soldiers and police.22  
Since the withdrawal of Western and traditional TCCs from Afghanistan, there has 
been much talk of a “return to UN peacekeeping” by these countries, including by the UK, 
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Netherland and Denmark.23 This was also a prominent theme of 
the UN Leaders’ Peacekeeping Summit held in September 2015, the first of its kind, which 
generated headlines suggesting a renewed commitment to peacekeeping, including offers 
by Western countries of “niche capabilities” to plug gaps in peacekeeping performance.24 A 
careful reading of detailed commitments and formal pledges made, however, aided by the 
knowledge of how past promises and initiatives have fared, should induce great caution, if 
not cynicism, about the substantive outcome of the summit. While offers should be 
scrutinised for their potential value – President Obama, for example, held out the prospect 
of US engineering and logistical support for UN missions, while China proposed to set up an 
                                                     
22  www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/apr15_2.pdf  
23 Adrian Johnson, “Back in Blue? A British Return to United Nations Peacekeeping”, RUSI Journal, Vol. 
160, No. 1, February 2015.  
24 “Declaration of Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping’, 28 September 2015. 
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8,000-strong “standby force” – there is little to suggest a major departure from recent 
trends.25  
As far as the future of UN operations is concerned, the significance of the shift in the 
composition and weighting of TCCs is twofold. First, while the individual soldiering skills and 
performance of countries that now provide the bulk troops to UN operations have often 
been subject to unfair generalisations, their ability to operate effectively as formed units in 
“non-permissive” environments plainly is, and will remain, severely limited by weaknesses 
and persistent shortages of enabling capabilities. Second, the now dominant TCCs, notably 
India but also Bangladesh, Pakistan and several Latin American countries, have, as a general 
rule, been far more reticent about the use of force in UN operations and have been 
especially sceptical of calls for ever more robust peacekeeping. Not unconnected to this, 
many of them have also resented their exclusion from the decision-making process about 
peacekeeping mandates.26  
In terms of mandate and operational focus, the single most important change since 
1999 has been the rise of the “Protection of Civilians” (POC) as a task formally entrusted to 
UN peacekeepers, a development closely connected to the shift in normative aspirations 
outlined above. Not only has POC become a regular item on the Council’s agenda but, more 
significantly, beginning with the mission to Sierra Leone in October 1999, UN peacekeepers 
have routinely and expressly been mandated under Chapter VII “to afford protection to 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.27 The challenges and distinctly uneven 
record of providing such protection have not prevented the Council from requiring UN 
peacekeepers to place it at the centre of their missions. Thus, Martin Kobler, head of the 
UN’s mission in Congo, sought to capture a wider trend when, in October 2014, he told the 
Council: “the protection of civilians is more than a mandated task, it is our raison d’etre in 
the DRC and a moral imperative of the UN.”28 
 This growing focus on civilian protection is also a key factor behind the calls for more 
muscular or robust peacekeeping that have been such a notable feature of contemporary 
peacekeeping practice and discourse.29 Since 1999 the Council has routinely given 
peacekeepers authority under Chapter VII to “use all necessary means” (or “take the 
necessary action”) to accomplish their mission. In a number of individual operations, notably 
                                                     
25 For an astute analysis of Summit, see Richard Gowan, “Red China’s Blue Helmets”, 
www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/30-un-peacekeeping-commitments-
gowan.  
26 See “PM Narendra Modi’s Statement”, 29 September 2015. 
27 S/RES/1270, 22 October 1999. 
28 7288th Meeting, 27 October 2014, S/PV.7288. 
29 “DPKO-DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping”, DPKO, UN, 2009.  
 Accepted for Publication in Journal of Strategic Studies on 18 July 2016 
12 
in Sierra Leone, Haiti and the DRC, that authority has in turn provided the basis for a far 
more proactive approach to the use of force than has historically been the case. Running 
parallel with these developments have also been various attempts, undertaken within and 
outside the Secretariat, to achieve “doctrinal and conceptual clarity” on the subject of the 
use of force in UN peacekeeping.30 
To assess the significance of these developments, how they have come together and 
their implications for the future of UN peacekeeping, it is necessary to turn to the actual 
performance and record of peacekeepers on the ground in the DRC.  
 
The UN Peacekeeping Operation in the DRC  
 
From “observation and monitoring” to “targeted offensive operations”, 1999-2013 
 
The return of the UN peacekeepers to the Congo after 35 years was initially a small-
scale affair.31 Following the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of August 1999, which, for a brief 
period, it was hoped would mark the end of the Second Congo War, the UN deployed a 
small monitoring mission to the country, the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC 
(MONUC).32 The language accompanying this initial deployment reflected the normative 
aspirations and “never-again” sentiment that infused discussions of peacekeeping following 
the disasters of the 1990s. Neither the Council nor the Secretariat, however, envisaged a 
proactive role for the mission beyond mere monitoring and observation of the hoped-for 
ceasefire, tasks that would have proved challenging in any event given the size of the 
country, the state of its infrastructure and the very limited capabilities of the force that was 
being deployed. What began as a modest observer force, however, quickly grew in size, 
eventually becoming the UN’s largest field operation with an overall strength of some 
22,000 uniformed personnel, and, crucially, with an increasingly ambitious, complex and 
partly conflicting set of goals.  
The UN’s deepening involvement in Congo after 1999 was driven by the fact that 
war and profound insecurity in the eastern part of the country continued to be the norm 
                                                     
30 Thierry Tardy, “A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Operations”, International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 18, no.2, 2011.  
31 For an authoritative background to the protracted emergency in the DRC, set in motion by the 
cataclysm of Rwanda genocide in 1994, the subsequent refugee crisis in eastern Congo and two 
Congo Wars, see Jason Stearn, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), and 
Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War – Congo, the Rwanda Genocide and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
32 S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999.  
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after 1999, at a horrific cost to civilian populations. Indeed, as Gérard Prunier has 
perceptively detailed, what followed the Lusaka process was not an end to the war but 
rather “the disintegration of a ‘rational’ war into a myriad of ‘privatized’, socially and 
economically motivated sub-conflicts.”33 
In July 2002, a formal peace accord reached in Pretoria between the DRC and 
Rwanda envisaged the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and the “simultaneous” 
dismantling of ex-Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militias in the east, 
the latter in order to meet Rwanda’s long-standing security concerns.34 Later that year, the 
main Congolese parties to the war signed an Accord global et inclusif, the outcome of long-
running negotiations that set out the modalities and arrangements  – including, crucially, 
over power-sharing and the integration of armed forces – that would govern a three-year 
transitional period through to multiparty elections scheduled for 2006, the first such 
elections to be held in the country in over forty years. The accord, concluded on 16 December 
2002, was signed by 11 parties, six of which, crucially, had armed forces of their own.  
These developments shaped the dynamics and underlying political economy of 
conflict in important ways. They did not, however, amount to a broad-based political 
settlement among social groups and, in particular, among the politico-military elites that 
control and regulate access to power and resources in what was, and remains, an acutely 
weak state. For this reason, they also did not bring an end to recurring cycles of violence and 
atrocities against civilians in the east. If anything, insecurity deepened, fuelled by a complex 
interaction of long-term and proximate causes, including the malign effects of local and 
regional economic agendas developed around the control and exploitation of the area’s 
natural resources,35 the persistence of deep socio-economic and ethnic grievances, and, not 
least, the proliferation and fragmentation of armed groups resulting from the failure of 
meaningful Security Sector Reform.36 Of particular significance for the UN operation was the 
failure to create an integrated and truly credible Congolese Army, Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).  
                                                     
33 Prunier, Africa’s World War, p.225. See also, “Neither war nor peace in the DRC: profiting and 
coping amid violence and disorder”, Review of African Political Economy, No.135, Vol.40, 2013.  
34 “Secretary-General Hails Pretoria Agreement”, www.un.org/press/en/2002/sc7479.doc.htm.  
35 “Special Report on Bisiye Mine”, MONUC Kinshasa (Natural Resources and HR Unit), 25 April 2008. 
36 For a trenchant analysis of the dynamics at work resulting in a “militarization of politics” and a 
metastasis of armed groups in the DRC following the formal Peace Accord and the power-sharing deal 
on which the transition process was predicated, see Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen, Maria Eriksson 
Baaz, The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 
pp.20-39. For the historical context and roots of the crisis in eastern Congo, see also René 
Lemarchand, “Reflections on the Recent Historiography of Eastern Congo’, Journal of African History, 
vol.54, no.3, 2013. 
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For UN peacekeepers, the acute and persistent vulnerability of civilian populations 
in the east was cruelly and repeatedly exposed in a series of “protection crises”: in Kisangani 
in 2002, Ituri in 2003, Bukavu in 2004, and Goma in 2008 and 2012. Of particular 
significance, setting the pattern for subsequent crises and exposing contradictions at the 
heart of UN’s mission, was the Ituri crisis.  
The inability of under-resourced and poorly equipped UN troops to halt widespread 
killings, atrocities and displacement in the spring of 2003,37 prompted the UN secretary-
general to ask the Security Council for a “well-equipped multinational force, under the lead 
of a Member State” to provide security and protection for civilians in Bunia, the regional 
capital of Ituri, then on the verge of being overrun.38 With France agreeing to act as 
“framework nation” for an EU force, the Council authorised the deployment of an Interim 
Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to the town of Bunia on 30 May 2003.39 Codenamed 
Operation Artemis, the IEMF deployed in early June 2003, shored up the UN’s precarious 
position in the town and helped to “stave off an impending humanitarian crisis”.40 And yet, 
while the IEMF helped avert an immediate humanitarian disaster in Bunia, the medium to 
long-term strategic impact of Operation Artemis and, crucially, its impact on the situation for 
civilians outside the area of deployment, proved far more limited and ambiguous. The 
principal reason for this was twofold, and point to wider problems raised by third-party 
efforts to protect civilians in conditions of civil war and the absence of a political process. 
First, as an assessment produced for the UN secretariat correctly identified, the French-led 
force’s “strict insistence on the very limited area of operations … merely pushed the 
problem of violent aggression against civilians beyond the environs of the town, where 
atrocities continued”.41 As UN staff had feared, the result was a “‘relocation’ of fighting and 
massacres elsewhere in Ituri”.42 Second, aside from the refusal to extend the mandate 
beyond Bunia and its airport, the IMEF’s effectiveness was also severely limited by the 
imposition of a short and non-negotiable timeframe for the withdrawal of the force (the 
French Government insisted on withdrawing the force by 1 September 2003). In fact, 
Artemis never covered more than a 15x15km area in and around Bunia, even though the 
                                                     
37 S/2003/566, 27 May 2003. On 9 May, the head of UN peacekeeping “informed the Security Council 
…that, unless it takes decisive action, the possibility of the situation spinning further out of control, 
with thousands of civilians massacred, could not be excluded”. “Statement on the Situation in Ituri”, 9 
May 2003, DPKO. 
38 S/2003/574, 15 May 2003. 
39 S/RES/1484, 30 May 2003. 
40 S/2003/1098, 17 November 2003, pp. 18–19. 
41 “Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the IEMF”, Best Practices Unit, DPKO, 2004,p. 14.  
42 “Note on Meeting with DPA and DPKO on the DRC”, DPKO, 9 June 2003. 
 Accepted for Publication in Journal of Strategic Studies on 18 July 2016 
15 
DPKO and MONUC on several occasions urged the French Government to take a flexible 
approach vis-à-vis the deployment and duration of the IEMF.43  
The consequences for the mission were twofold and exposed the limitations of its 
protection mandate in the absence of a wider political settlement among political elites and 
key regional players; limitations that have surfaced in other operations – Sudan, CAR and 
Mali  – where POC responsibilities have been assumed in conditions of on-going civil war. 
First, it ensured that MONUC’s protection responsibilities became ever more central to the 
mission; a process that led to the Council’s decision, in December 2008, to give the 
protection of civilians “priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and 
resources, over any of the other tasks”.44 Next, and linked to this, in the wake of the Ituri 
crisis, a steady expansion of UN troop numbers and a mandate change authorising 
peacekeepers “to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate”,45 signalled a shift towards 
more robust peacekeeping and a more proactive use of force. This shift was especially 
notable from 2004-5 onwards when UN peacekeepers, with and in support of the new 
Congolese Army, engaged in what Jean-Marie Guéhenno described as the  “aggressive 
pursuit” of “negative” forces in the east.46  
The effect of these operations, however, was decidedly mixed, not least because of 
the appalling human rights record of the Congolese Army with which MONUC was allied and 
to which it was lending direct operational support, a reality that weakened MONUC’s 
legitimacy and tarnished its image in the eyes of locals.47 Enormous logistical challenges, the 
highly uneven quality of troops serving under UN command, the absence of key enabling 
capabilities (especially mobility assets) and disunity of command, all combined to weaken 
further MONUC’s ability to provide effective protection. The inevitable result was a 
seemingly endless cycle of protection crises, the most humiliating of which was the fall of 
the provincial capital of Goma in November 2012 to forces of the Rwanda-backed 
Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23), which had emerged earlier in the year following a mutiny 
among soldiers formerly belonging to the Congrès national pour la defence du peuple 
(CNDP) and supposedly integrated into FARDC. The ease with which the provincial capital of 
North Kivu, with a population of nearly one million, including large numbers of refugees and 
internally displaced, was overrun in the presence of some 1,500 UN peacekeepers, seemed 
                                                     
43 Jan-Gunnar Isberg and Lotta Tillberg, By All Necessary Means: Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar Isberg’s 
Experience from Service in the Congo, 2003–2005 (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 
2012), p. 22. 
44 S/RES/1856, 22 December 2008, para.6. 
45 S/RES/1493, 28 July 2003, para.26. 
46 “DRC: Report of visit from 6-15 March 2006”, 20 March 2006, DPKO, UN. 
47 John Holmes, The Politics of Humanity (London: Head of Zeus, 2013), pp.138,144-5. 
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to lay bare the failure of MONUSCO’s efforts to bring stability to the east. It also exposed 
how a large-scale peacekeeping mission had “ended up almost entirely disconnected from 
any political process”.48  
 
Enter the Force Intervention Brigade, 2013-15  
 
The humiliating fall of Goma did at least serve to galvanise the UN and donor 
countries into action. This was initially two-pronged. The first step was potentially, and 
certainly should have been, the most important, involving as it did an international 
diplomatic effort under the auspices of the UN, the Africa Union (AU) and South African 
Development Community (SADC) to re-energise a long-dormant political process in the 
search for a wider settlement among actors within the country and across the region. In 
encouraging a more substantive dialogue between the DRC and its neighbours, above all, 
Rwanda, the initiative rightly, though this had long been obvious, recognised that long-term 
stability in the DRC was impossible without progress towards a broad-based political 
settlement. A promising step in this direction was the agreement, reached by 11 countries in 
February 2013, on a Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region 
(PSCF).49 
The second element of the response to the fall of Goma was the decision to 
strengthen MONUSCO’s ability – through an increase in resources and a change in mandate 
giving peacekeepers a war-fighting role – to confront, in theory, all armed groups in eastern 
Congo, estimated to number more than fifty and “ranging from neatly structured militias to 
ragtag bandit gangs”.50 Authorised by the Council in March 2013 as a specialised unit within 
MONUSCO and consisting of some 3,000 troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, a 
Force Intervention Brigade was tasked with carrying out “targeted offensive operations” to 
neutralize, defeat and disarm all armed groups in eastern DRC.51 Although MONUSCO’s 
Chapter VII mandate had long since been beefed up to allow for robust action by its 
peacekeepers, and fighting in the east had at times, especially in 2005 and 2006, been 
extensive, Resolution 2098 marked a qualitative change; a fact widely recognised, whether 
welcomed or viewed with apprehension, by observers, diplomats and UN officials.  
                                                     
48 Jean Arnault, “A background to the report of HIPPO”, CIC, 6 August 2015.   
49 “Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (PSCF)”, 24 February 2013. 
50 Christoph Vogel, “Islands of Stability or Swamps of Insecurity?”, Africa Policy Brief, No.9, 2014, 
pp.1-2. That figure has since increased. See footnote no.8. 
51 S/RES/2098, 28 March 2013, para.12 (b). The idea for the FIB came initially from the International 
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which at first conceived of it an offensive non-UN 
force to deal with armed groups in eastern DRC.  
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The hopes initially vested in the FIB by Ban Ki-Moon and diplomats in New York 
appeared to be borne out early on when offensive operations alongside the Congolese army 
in October and November 2013 looked to have brought about a swift defeat of M23.52 Since 
the removal of M23, however, the FIB’s readiness to engage other armed groups, notably 
the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), has been far more half-hearted. 
The FDLR, which includes remnants of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia members that 
fled into eastern Congo after the Rwanda genocide, is notorious for its record of mass 
atrocity crimes. While estimates of the number of FDLR combatants has declined, now 
ranging from 1,500 to 5,000, the group remains a critical source of regional instability, in 
part because of its alliances with other militia groups but, more importantly, because its 
presence and predatory activities have provided Rwanda with a standing justification for 
continuing its own interference in eastern DRC.53 By mid-2014, the Secretary-General 
reported that while “some progress” had been made in tackling “the recurring cycles of 
violence in eastern Congo”, it was “still too slow and remain[ed] extremely fragile.”54 A long-
awaited Strategic Review of MONUSCO presented to the Council some six months later 
concluded bluntly that “the military defeat of M23 notwithstanding, Congolese and foreign 
armed groups … continue to pose a threat to the civilian population and the overall stability 
and development of the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region.”55 Developments since 
then have done nothing to change this grim picture.56 In short, the “step-change” in the use 
of force represented by the FIB has not addressed the underlying political issues at the heart 
of conflict and the complex political economy that drives much of the violence. FIB’s 
creation has reinforced rather than moved beyond the mission’s established pattern of 
“band-aid protection, usually responding to the symptoms of violence rather than 
addressing the fundamental causes of that violence through a political-military strategy.”57 
                                                     
52 “DRC claims defeat of M23 rebels”, 5 November 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
24815241. The decisiveness of M23’s defeat soon came into question as significant numbers of M23 
combatants, including its commander, Sultani Makenga, crossed into Uganda shortly after the 
supposed rout. S/2013/757, 17 December 2013, paragraph 40 and 20. 
53“FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies”, DRC Affinity Group, SSRC, March 2014. 
54 S/2014/450, 30 June 2014, para. 86.  
55 S/2014/957 (“Strategic Review’), 30 December 2014,para.16. 
56 See reports of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO, S/2015/172, 10 March 2015, and S/2015/486, 
26 June 2015.  
57 Alan Doss, “In the Footsteps of Dr Bunche”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, No.5, October 
2014, p.730. See also Hannah Cooper, “More harm than good? UN's Islands of Stability in DRC”, 
OXFAM, 8 May 2014.  
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What accounts for the FIBs failure and, more broadly, what does it teach us about 
the limits of robust peacekeeping and the nature of the civilian protection challenges facing 
MONUSCO? Three sets of issues stand out.  
 
The Politics of Peacekeeping Participation and TCC attitudes to risk and the use of force 
 
The FIB was formally established to deal decisively with the long-standing threat posed by 
multiple armed groups operating in eastern DRC: the M-23 to be sure, but also a myriad of 
other groups: “the FDLR, the ADF, the APCLS, the LRA, the National Force of Liberation (FNL), 
the various Mayi Mayi groups and all other armed groups.”58 But there were other, not 
explicitly articulated, reasons for its creation that help explain its limited success in dealing 
with armed groups and offering meaningful protection to civilians. These are important to 
flag because they underline the degree to which politics and interest-based calculations by 
TTCs shape both the decisions to contribute to UN peacekeeping and, crucially, the 
character and nature of those contributions once deployed. With regard to the creation of 
the FIB, two considerations point to the importance of politics and TCC interests.  
First, the principal contributors to the Force, South Africa and Tanzania, were 
prepared to go on the offensive against the M23 because they saw the movement as an 
instrument of Rwandan policy in the region. As such, the FIB’s initial and very robust 
operation had a crucial regional political dimension to it with South Africa in particular 
anxious to rein in Paul Kagame perceived hegemonic aspirations.59 Following the apparent 
defeat of the Rwanda-backed M23 and the withdrawal of its troops into Rwanda and 
Uganda (many still to be demobilised), however, the FIB proved far less prepared to target 
other groups, including the FDLR. In short, the origins and activities of the FIB are, at least in 
part, better understood in terms of regional politics and the political agendas held by key 
troop contributors, than as a principled willingness of traditional TCCs to experiment in more 
robust peacekeeping.60  
Second, following the fall of Goma in 2012, enthusiasm within sections of the 
Secretariat and among Council members for the FIB and its more aggressive concept of 
operations was partly a function of mounting unhappiness with the performance of many 
                                                     
58 S/RES/2098, para. 8.  
59 Kagame’s determination to track down and “silence” Rwandese dissidents abroad is one factor that 
has contributed to the deterioration of relations between South Africa and Rwanda. Interview with 
UN official, February 2015. See also Geoffrey York and Judi Rever,“Rwanda’s Hunted”, Globe and 
Mail, 2 May 2014.  
60 “Congo: Ending the Status Quo”, Africa Briefing No.107, ICG, 17 December 2014, p.13. 
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MONUSCO contingents wedded to “static and passive” deployments, unwilling to conduct 
patrols to vulnerable areas and limiting “patrolling activities to daylight hours only”.61 By late 
2014, however, the sub-optimal performance and reluctance to use force were found to 
extend to the FIB as well, which the Secretary-General now felt needed to “be re-energized 
to take a lead planning and combat role in joint offensive operations with FARDC”.62 The 
Strategic Review also called on other contingents to become “more engaged in joint 
operations”.  The evident reluctance to do so is partly a reflection of continuing capacity 
gaps within the mission. It also, however, reflects long-standing differences among TCCs 
regarding the use and utility of force by peacekeepers, as well as about the kind of risks to 
which member states are prepared to expose their troops.63 
There is a further consideration here. As Alan Doss, SRSG in the DRC from 2007 to 
2010, has noted: “TCC's have often proved risk adverse and reluctant to engage in the kind 
of robust peacekeeping that civilian protection on occasion demands, part of the reason for 
this is … [is] that the UN itself has not been as straightforward with TCCs as it should have 
been. Too often the pressure to generate troops outweighs frankness and has led the UN to 
underplay the risk factor for fear of discouraging potential contributors. Subsequently, when 
robust operations have been required, contingents have responded by saying that they had 
not signed up for such operations and were not equipped to undertake them.”64 
  
Civilian Protection, Expectations and “Security Partners” 
 
Reporting on the implementation of POC mandates in eight on-going UN operations, 
the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in 2014 welcomed the FIB’s offensive 
mandate as a “new way of protecting civilians.”65 The history of MONUSCO since adopting 
this “new way”, however, will only have reinforced lessons and highlighted policy dilemmas 
from earlier operations when, between 2003 and 2011, UN peacekeepers and the Congolese 
army had gone on the offensive against armed groups in the east. Those operations had 
shown that while the growing emphasis on civilian protection raised expectations among 
local populations, the inability of under-resourced, over-stretched and under-performing 
peacekeeping contingents to meet those expectations, rather than leading to a 
                                                     
61 “Strategic Review”, para.30. 
62 Ibid., para. 51. 
63 “Ending the Status Quo”, p.7. See also “Opinions Divided over Protection of Civilians”,5 November 
2015, www.un.org/press/en/2015/gaspd597.doc.htm  
64 Alan Doss, E-mail correspondence, 12 September 2013. 
65  A/68/787, OIOS, 7 March 2014, para.5. 
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reassessment of strategy and mission objectives, increased pressure on mission leaderships 
to plug protection gaps in a “band-aid” fashion. While tactical “victories” provided a 
measure of protection in some localities for limited periods of time, the effect elsewhere 
was an increase of predation and violence targeting civilian populations, and a consequent 
surge in the number of internally displaced (as illustrated by 2003 Ituri crisis and the effects 
of Operation Artemis discussed above).  
The mechanism behind this perverse outcome is not unique to the UN’s experience 
in Congo.66 Indeed, MONUSCO’s experience points to a fundamental dilemma that has 
frequently been faced by ill-equipped and over-stretched peacekeepers mandated to act 
robustly in conditions where there is no peace to keep. On the one hand, the expectation 
that physical protection is about to be extended by peacekeepers to a civilian population 
threatened by an armed group will prompt that group to step up attacks against the 
threatened population before effective protection can be provided, a calculation whose 
sinister logic has been played out repeatedly in Congo and elsewhere.67 At the same time, 
the hope that protection will be forthcoming has, unsurprisingly, encouraged vulnerable 
civilians to seek refuge, often in large numbers, in locations where peacekeepers are 
deployed. Given the reality that UN troops are thinly spread out, logistically hamstrung and 
devoid of reserves and critical force multipliers, such locations have – as in Congo, South 
Sudan, Mali and the CAR – provided attractive targets for attack. Faced with these kinds of 
challenges to its protection mandate, but also because its overall mandate is in support of 
the authority of a legally constituted host government, the UN has had to rely on and work 
with national authorities and their security forces. Such reliance, however, has created its 
own set of problems as local allies, themselves parties to on-going conflict, have proved 
deeply abusive in pursuit of their own political and military agendas. In the case of the DRC, 
as Jean-Marie Guéhenno later noted, following the elections of 2006, the UN “kept a central 
military role, becoming almost an auxiliary of the government in the east.”68 And yet the 
                                                     
66 For a sophisticated study of these mechanisms in Congo, see Emily Paddon Rhoads, Taking Side in 
Peacekeeping (Oxford: OUP, 2016); for similar dynamics in South Sudan, see Michael Arensen, 
“Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites 2013-2016”, IOM Report, 2016. 
67Following a visit to DRC on the eve of elections in 2006, the head of DPKO concluded: “The UN 
military operations also produce negative consequences. UN Agency and NGO personnel have 
reported new waves of IDPs fleeing armed groups under UN pressure, which are inflicting reprisals on 
the civilian population.” “DRC: Report of visit from 6-15 March 2006”, 20 March 2006, DPKO. 
68 Marie Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 2015), p.159.  
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predatory and abusive practices of the ill-disciplined Congolese army persisted, further 
corroding the image and legitimacy of MONUSCO in the eyes of local populations.69  
 
Neglect of political follow-up 
 
The single most important reason for the failure of the FIB to arrest the recurring cycles of 
violence in the east lies, paradoxically, not with the FIB itself. It lies, rather, in the larger 
failure to connect and properly align the activities of the FIB, and indeed those of MONUSCO 
as a whole, with a longer-term strategy geared towards reaching a political settlement 
among elites in Congo and across the region – a strategy that would need to be based on an 
understanding of the interdependence of local, national and regional drivers of conflict, and 
the critical importance of substantive as distinct from largely symbolic security sector reform 
aimed at creating a truly national and integrated Congolese army. The UN-brokered PSC 
Framework of February 2013 and the appointment of a UN Special Envoy to ensure 
“convergence of all initiatives” towards more “durable solutions”, were, certainly on paper, 
steps in the right direction. They depended critically for their success, however, on sustained 
political follow-up and, in the words of Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “strategic engagement in the 
politics of Congo”, including from the Security Council.70 The dangers of this not happening 
and the deeper source of the FIB’s failure were perceptively recognised at the time by 
seasoned observers of the region who noted how the “new initiative [FIB] is not formally 
linked to any wider political strategy for dealing with armed groups; there are no clear 
follow-up measures, nor is there a new demobilization plan, nor any new provision for 
security sector reform.”71 In the end, it did not take long before the initiative to align the 
political and diplomatic efforts through the PSCF with the activities of MONUSCO petered 
out.72 Reflecting on his experiences in the DRC, John Holmes identified one of the key 
reasons for the repeated lack of sustained political follow-up. The DRC, he resignedly noted 
in his memoirs,“was, in fact, something of a diplomatic orphan”, and “it was not clear that 
those in charge in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris or London were prepared to put in 
the tough diplomatic miles to turn the situation around.”73 
                                                     
69 This became especially clear during a series of anti-FDLR campaigns – Unmoja Wetu, Kimia II and 
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73 Holmes, Politics of Humanity, p.139. 
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Whither UN peacekeeping and Implications for UN’s role in peace and security 
 
Any discussion about the future direction of UN peacekeeping and its place within 
UN’s overall mission of promoting of peace and security must start with current realities and 
the world as we find it, not ideal scenarios or hoped-for developments. It must factor in the 
balance of geopolitical influences, power relationships and normative developments that 
bear upon the UN’s role in international politics, and it must seek to understand how these 
have evolved and shifted over time. It does not follow from this, however, that the history of 
UN peacekeeping - including the “Cold War” period and the 1990s - does not also offer 
lessons of a more fundamental and less transient kind; lessons not beholden to the 
preoccupations and particular circumstances of any given time and place. UN field 
operations since 2000, not only in the DRC but equally in Darfur, CAR, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
South Sudan, and elsewhere, serve to reinforce two of these more enduring lessons, and 
both honesty and realism about their operational and political implications are required 
before any assessment can be made of the true prospects for UN peacekeeping and, in 
particular, for the role of force in future operations.  The first of these has to do with the 
identity and cohesiveness of any military force under UN command, that is, a force 
authorised by the Council, supported and directed by the Secretariat and drawing for its 
strength upon the contributions of numerous TTCs. The second concerns the distinctive and 
inescapable challenges that confront any such force when it deploys in situations of intra-
state conflict and civil war. 
 
The Chimera of Force Cohesion and Unity of Command  
 
There is a natural limit – insufficiently recognised in much of literature on UN reform 
– to how far the historical weaknesses and deficiencies of UN field operations can ever be 
more than partially mitigated, let alone overcome. This is true, above all, for the holy grail of 
mission cohesion and unity of command, or what Kofi Annan, in an effort to stiffen the 
resolve of troop contributors to the UN’s flailing mission in Sierra Leone in August 2000, 
emphasised as “the international character of the Force and the overarching need to respect 
the UN chain of command.”74 While the ideal embodied in Annan’s admonition needs to be 
stated, it also needs to be recognised for what it is: an ideal. Conflicting national priorities, 
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limited resources and risk-aversion among TCCs will always ensure that missions will be 
hampered by split and uncertain loyalties. Similarly, the stubborn persistence of 
cumbersome financial and procurement regulations, and the haphazard and unreliable 
provision of key capacities and force enablers, notably in logistics, intelligence, engineering, 
aviation support and reserves, will continue to define “outer limits for UN peacekeeping 
operations”.75 One can try to mitigate these weaknesses and spurts of reform, including the 
steps taken in the wake of the Brahimi Report, can have a beneficial impact. In the end, 
however, these and other reform efforts have, at best, only attenuated rather than 
eliminated deep, inbuilt and, as far as military effectiveness is concerned, ineradicable 
weaknesses. And there is a further consideration here.  
Developments since 2000 have given rise to a paradoxical, one might say perverse, 
dynamic. On the one hand, the now routine deployment of peacekeepers to areas where 
there is no peace to keep, the centrality of the civilian protection mandate and concomitant 
emphasis on robust peacekeeping, have all heightened the operational importance of 
ensuring that UN missions are properly resourced and do in fact function as cohesive and 
integrated formations. On the other hand, these very developments have served to 
accentuate the debilitating impact of existing weaknesses, especially the readiness of TCCs 
to pay more than lip service to formal command and control obligations. The reasons for this 
are partly practical. Protecting civilians alongside other peacekeeping tasks in conditions of 
internal armed conflict pose operational challenges that UN forces are particularly ill-suited 
to address given the nature of the capacity gaps that plague UN peacekeeping. Even if this 
limitation were addressed, however, differences among TTCs in how mandates are 
interpreted and, specifically, over attitudes to the use of force, point to more serious 
obstacles of a political nature. When it was decided to adopt a new concept of operations 
and respond more aggressively to further threats to the mission in Sierra Leone in August 
2000,76 Jordan, Malaysia and India decided to withdraw their forces. In more recent cases 
where contingents have not actually withdrawn, the aforementioned report by the OIOS 
found - entirely unsurprisingly - evidence “that a de facto dual line of command exercised by 
troop-contributing countries over their troops serving in peacekeeping missions regulates 
the use of force in missions.”77 Significantly, and as noted above, the TCCs that now provide 
the bulk of peacekeepers, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as many contributors from 
Latin America, remain deeply sceptical about the trend in favour of ever-more robust use of 
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force by UN peacekeepers. 
 
Peacekeeping in Civil Wars 
 
The most significant contextual development in the longue durée of UN peacekeeping is the 
shift in operational focus that began as the Cold War was coming to an end – a shift away 
from deployments designed to mitigate and contain conflicts between states, towards 
deployments within states weakened, traumatised and divided by civil war and state 
fragility. There are important exceptions to the Cold War pattern of inter-state deployments 
and the experiences of peacekeepers in Congo in the early 1960s and Lebanon in the late 
1970s and early 1980s in particular, offer lessons that remain relevant to contemporary 
peacekeeping. As a general trend, however, the shift towards internal peacekeeping is 
unmistakeable and, indeed, all but one of the twenty-one new operations launched since 
1999 have been deployed in situations of latent and, increasingly, on-going civil wars. And 
yet, beyond the perfunctory acknowledgement that realities on the ground have changed 
and peacekeepers remain badly under-resourced to confront “new realities”, the critical 
importance of this development has been underplayed in the most recent cycle of soul-
searching about the future on UN peace operations. More precisely, far too little attention 
has been given to the structural impediments to effectiveness in UN peacekeeping that 
inhere in the very condition of civil war, especially in circumstances where operations 
extend over time and where, partly as a result, the UN’s field presence has become 
decoupled from any meaningful political process aimed at reaching lasting settlements 
among parties to the conflict. 
In part, these impediments have to do with the volatile environment that typically 
characterise such conflicts, key features of which have included: the absence of clear front 
lines; the presence of large numbers of internally displaced; numerous armed groups, often 
poorly controlled and prone to preying on civilians; war-ravaged infrastructure spread over 
vast geographical distances; and, persistent insecurity fuelled by predatory political 
economies and power struggles among elites over control of territory, populations and the 
location of governmental authority.  
For UN missions operating in such settings there is, however, a more fundamental 
challenge: a UN force deployed within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state in which the host 
government is faced with internal challenges to its authority will find it impossible, especially 
over the long run, to remain above the domestic political fray, however it much it may aspire 
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to do so. As Alan James astutely notes:  “On an internal scene a government is but one of 
the actors; in one degree or another the political balance is likely to be in constant 
movement; and the way in which a UN force responds may well have some impact on the 
balance, or – which in effect comes to the same thing – be seen as shifting the balance.”78  
The robust use of force, in particular, cannot but have an impact on that political balance 
and thus pose a threat to the UN’s chief asset as an interlocutor in internal conflicts: its 
perceived impartiality in relation to the disputants. Given this reality, it should not come as a 
surprise that relations between UN missions and host governments in internal scenarios 
have invariably deteriorated over time as the host governments – weak, deeply suspicious of 
outside meddling and protective of their sovereign rights – become increasingly resentful of 
obstacles to their unfettered control over internal affairs. And when, as in contemporary 
peacekeeping, the mandates given to the UN mission are themselves intrusive and include 
politically sensitive and potentially conflicting objectives, tensions are unavoidable.  
 
Limits to Coercion: and the UN’s role in international peace and security  
 
With regard to the future of “robust peacekeeping” and its connection to the 
broader question of the UN’s role in peace and security, it is important to draw the right 
conclusions from the preceding analysis.  
The first of these is the need to reaffirm the validity of the basic distinction between 
what is essentially a peacekeeping operation and one that is premised on the logic of war 
fighting and enforcement. The meaning of “essentially” in this context has little to do with 
whether or not a mission has been formally authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter; by 
now, almost all are as a matter of routine. The key to the distinction lies in whether or not 
achieving mission objectives is dependent, in the final analysis, on building consent and 
support among parties to a given conflict as part of a wider effort – of which peacekeeping is 
merely one part – to shore up or lay the foundations for a lasting political settlement.  The 
history of peacekeeping since 1999 shows just how fragmentary and incomplete such 
consent can be, quite especially in conditions of civil war. Combining activities that rely on 
consent, cooperation and access with offensive military operations, all within the same 
mission, have historically proved highly destabilising, politically as well as in humanitarian 
terms. An inescapable corollary of this is that there will be circumstances when the 
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instrument of peacekeeping is not appropriate. UN peacekeeping since 1999 does not 
fundamentally alter these lessons.  
 Now, while the qualitative distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement 
must be reaffirmed, it does not follow that the UN can or should only operate in 
environments where distinctions are clear-cut and simple, or that the use of force cannot, at 
the margins and in the right circumstances, be used with, potentially, positive effect. There 
are instances since 1999 when properly equipped and properly commanded forces have 
scored tactical victories in response to immediate crises and emergencies: preventing the 
collapse of the UN mission in Sierra Leone in 2000; dismantling the gang-structures in Haiti 
in 2006-7; securing Bunia in eastern DRC in 2003, and in defeating Laurant Gbabgo’s violent 
challenge to the outcome of elections in Cote d’Ivoire in 2011. In evaluating these tactical 
successes, however, it is vital not to lose sight of the wider, and more critical, lessons 
offered by the case.  
For one, all of these involved well-resourced and highly capable forces, precisely 
what UN missions have tended to lack. Moreover, the military challenge faced in each case, 
though determined and real, was mounted by marginal actors and was, ultimately, 
unimpressive. But far more important than these qualifications is the fact that the long-term 
effectiveness and strategic impact of these and similar actions depended – and always will 
depend – on whether the actual use of force is linked and properly calibrated to serve 
political purposes. With the partial exception and special case of Sierra Leone, the link 
between military action and political purpose has been weak to non-existent in UN 
operations since 1999.  In Sierra Leone, UK military intervention was able to check, at a 
critical juncture, advances by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other armed groups 
in the country. Crucially, however, this short, sharp and limited action, was followed by 
concerted diplomatic moves aimed at shoring up the post-war political dispensation, 
including a sustained effort to galvanise others to contribute to a beefed up and 
reconfigured UN mission and, above all, a serious commitment to reforming and 
professionalising the country’s armed forces. As a fine-grained study of the UK’s intervention 
makes clear, even though the “use of force was critical in creating an opportunity for 
political progress, it was not in itself decisive or even that strategically significant” – long 
term success was contingent on political follow-up at the UN and regionally, underpinned by 
a credible programme of security sector reform.79 In Haiti, by contrast, “tactical success 
through the use of force led to only limited strategic payoffs … with MINUSTAH struggling to 
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integrate the use of force into a larger project for Haitian political and economic 
transformation”.80 A similar picture emerges from the various applications of robust force in 
the DRC, including Operation Artemis in 2003, whose stabilising effects were highly localised 
and displaced violence, including widespread atrocities, elsewhere, as well as the Ituri 
campaign of 2005. The FIB has only further underlined a basic truth: UN peacekeeping 
missions remain structurally ill-equipped and politically ill-suited to use force effectively in 
support of strategic objectives.  
In the end, the single most important implication to flow from the analysis above is 
that UN peacekeeping in and of itself – and most certainly robust peacekeeping of the kind 
attempted over the past decade and a half – does not provide the royal road to addressing 
deep-seated and violent conflict in fragile and conflict-ridden states. UN peacekeepers can 
undertake a range of ancillary tasks aimed at strengthening and helping in the search for a 
lasting political settlement. That range is now longer and more complex than it was in the 
era of “classical” peacekeeping and includes security sector reform, humanitarian support 
activities, complex monitoring and confidence-building tasks. When conditions require and 
resources permit, peacekeepers may also be in a position to respond locally to obstructionist 
violence and immediate emergencies. These are all important tasks and the scope for 
improving the quality of delivery in each is considerable, especially in the vital area of 
security sector reform, which, all too often, has been half-hearted, under-funded, overly 
technocratic and ignorant of the political economies of conflict, with predictably shambolic 
results. But they are ancillary tasks in the sense that their lasting contribution to addressing 
conflict depends not only on how effectively they are delivered but, more importantly, on 
whether they are aligned to the overriding objective of arriving at and helping to consolidate 
viable political settlements. In other words, UN field operations and activities, which have 
become increasingly divorced the central enterprise of mediating and reaching political 
settlements to conflicts, must be reconnected to that enterprise. Encouragingly, this is also a 
central theme that runs through the report of the High-Level Panel established by Ban Ki-
Moon in 2014: an emphasis on the “centrality of negotiated political solutions to internal 
conflict”81 and on the supporting role that UN field operations, striving to enlarge the margin 
of consent among parties to the conflict by nurturing the asset of impartiality, can play in 
the search for such solutions. 
This brings us to a  final consideration and it concerns the larger issue of a 
revitalisation of the UN’s role in peace and security. Much of the emphasis above has been 
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on the structural and political constraints that have long placed and, as argued, will continue 
to place certain inescapable limits on the ability of the UN to act as a coercive agency in 
international affairs. The geopolitical realities of the day, reflected in the deep divisions that 
now exist within the Security Council on a range of regional and thematic issues, provide, at 
one level, further grounds of pessimism about any revitalisation of the UN’s role. It is also 
possible, however, to adjust one’s focus and ask what, even in such inauspicious 
circumstances, the UN has got going for it, what particular advantages it brings, and, indeed, 
whether the present moment offers opportunities for the organisation to insert itself and 
play a constructive role in promoting peace and security. After all, peacekeeping itself 
emerged from the search, as Dag Hammarskjöld put it at the time, for “possibilities of 
substantive action by the UN in a split world”.82 There is today no doubting the split. As far 
as the UN carving out a distinct and constructive role for itself, however, the period between 
1987 and 1992, that is, the second term of Perez de Cuellar’s time in office, may offer a 
more interesting historical analogy than the Cold War of the 1950s. This was not a period in 
which Cold War tensions and divisions among the Permanent Member of the Council had all 
of a sudden been removed: it was period of transition and uncertainty but also, crucially, 
one of possibilities for independent political action by the UN. Exploiting those possibilities, 
the UN was able to play a mediating role in helping to wind down the Iran-Iraq war; in 
brokering a plan for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; in facilitating 
Namibia’s transition to independence; in bringing war to an end in Nicaragua and in 
negotiating peace accords for El Salvador and Guatemala. The UN’s involvement and 
concrete contribution in each of these cases – including through the deployment of 
peacekeepers, monitors and election observes as well as centrally-involved mediators – 
varied greatly, and in some cases were very modest. They proceeded however from an 
appreciation of both the possibilities and limitations of UN action, and were directed 
towards the central objective of securing or shoring up viable negotiated settlements.83 To 
be sure, the opportunities presented by the tail end of the Cold War were, in important 
respects, unique, and there is, no doubt, an ephemeral quality to some of the achievements 
of the period. Even so, the UN and the secretary-general’s role during those years, should 
give pause for thought as the Organisation, its limitations frequently remarked upon and 
evident for all to see, ponders the political space within which it and the instrumentality of 
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peacekeeping can still to serve as “tool for peace and security.” Over the past fifteen years, 
the limitations of peacekeeping have been powerfully exposed; the possibilities of 
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